Aggregate production functions : does fixed capital matter ? by Fisher, Franklin M.

:.i
:•.<
m
•
-:',,:^]r
working paper
department
of economics
AGGREGATE PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS: DOES FIXED
CAPITAL MATTER?
Franklin M. Fisher
Nimber 284 July 1981
massachusetts
institute of
technology
50 memorial drive
Cambridge, mass. 02139

AGGREGATE PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS: DOES FIXED
CAPITAL MATTER?
Franklin M. Fisher
Niamber 284 July 1981
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
IVIIT Libraries
http://www.archive.org/details/aggregateproduct284fish
AGGREGATE PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS: DOES FIXED CAPITAL MATTER?
Franklin M. Fisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1. Introduction
In a series of papers some years ago, I examined the question of the
existence of aggregate production functions . I did so in the context of
a model in which each firm's technology was embodied in its capital stock
so that capital (of several types) was not physically homogeneous but rather
specific to firms while labour and output (each of which could be of
several types) were assigned to firms so as to make the entire system pro-
duce efficiently. In such a model, the efficient production frontier is
readily seen to depend on the amount of each capital type which each
firm has and on the total amounts of each labour type and each output type
for the system as a whole . The aggregation question was then that of the
possibility of simplifying by aggregating over capital (for firms and types)
or over labour types or over output types.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for such aggregation turned out
to be very strong. Restricting attention to constant returns, they can
be roughly summarized as follows: First, an aggregate of the desired kind
2
must exist at the level of each firm. Second, if capital is to be aggre-
gated, firm production functions can differ by at most capital-augmenting
technical changes, although the capital to be augmented can already be an
otherwise unrestricted ^^gregate at the firm level. If labour or output
is to be aggregated, on the other hand, the corresponding firm-level aggre-
gates must all be the same, but the firm's production functions are not
otherwise restricted. In effect, to take output aggregation as an example,
this means that every firm must produce the same market basket of outputs
as every other firm, differing only as to scale, with the composition of
the common basket depending on prices.
These conditions are surely very strong and unlikely to be fulfilled
in practice. One question which arises, however, is the extent to which
such strength really has to do with the ass\amption that capital is immobile
and technology embodied in it. Surely many of the results depend on that
assumption but despite the impetus given to the analysis by the "Cambridge-
4
Cambridge debate", it is not plain that all of them do. Indeed, as we
shall see in the present paper, some of the results have at least as much
to do with the fact that aggregation over individual productive units
(firms) is involved as with the assumption that capital is fixed.
The present paper investigates this question and examines the aggre-
gation issues which arise when all factors are mobile. Aside from the
interest in this question which attaches to an investigation of just how
much fixity of capital matters , there are some reasons for considering it
on its own grounds. First, it may be considered that capital is mobile in
the long run. This may be thought of (in the longest run) as the fungibility
of capital funds; in some shorter time period there are circumstances
in which individual types of capital goods , not interchangeable among them-
selves, are nevertheless moved about among productive units to secure
efficient production. We can think of such cases as brought about by
efficient second-hand markets or by a central-planning authority. At a
less grand level, we can think of a single firm managing several produc-
tive processes and efficiently allocating capital goods as well as other
factors to them. The analysis below exhibits the conditions under which the
resulting efficient production surface permits of aggregation.
The results obtained are aesthetically rather pleasing. Aside from
the obvious fact that mobility of capital goods guarantees the existence of
an aggregate over firms for any single capital type (and thus eliminates
the need for any other conditions such as capital-augmentation) , they are
essentially as follows (for constant returns) . The efficient production
surface for two fiirms permits aggregation over some group of variables
(outputs or factors) if and only if: (1) such an aggregate exists at the
level of each firm separately; and (2) either the firm level aggregates are
the same in both firms or^ the two firms ' production functions differ by at
most an "aggregate-augmenting" technical change. Conditions for aggregation
when many firms are involved can be built up from these results.
We thus see the role which fixity of capital plays (beyond preventing
the aggregation over firms of a single capital type without special conditions)
The mere fact that aggregation over firms is involved, whether or not capital
is fixed, restricts aggregation possibilities to the two special cases just
described. The effect of assuming capital is fixed is merely to go from a
situation in which either special case suffices for aggregation for any
group of factors or of outputs to a situation in which one special case
applies to aggregation over all fixed factors and the other applies to
7 To put it
aggregation over groups of variable factors or of outputs
.
differently, moving from a fixed to a mobile capital model does not really
introduce new cases which permit aggregation; it merely makes the union
of previously known cases applicable.
2. The Model
Firms are indexed by v=l, ...,n. Each firm has a production function
given by:
(2.1) y(v) = f^(X(v), L(v))
.
This will be interpreted in more than one way. In the simplest interpreta-
tion, y(v) is a single output, homogeneous across firms, X (v) is an r-vector
of factors to be aggregated and L(v) an s-vector of other factors. L(v) and
X(v) are allocated to firms so as to maximize y = i;y{v) , s\ibject to the
constraints
(2.2) I:l(v) = L; EX{v) = X.
* *
Calling the maximized value of output, y , this makes y a function of L and
X, say G(X,L). The question to be analyzed is that of when aggregation over
the r factors in X are possible; i.e., when can we write:
(2.3) y* = G(X,L) = H(<|j(X),L)
for some scalar-valued function, ii{').
On this interpretation, we can think of X as a vector of (mobile)
capital of r different types and i) {X) as an aggregate capital index. Alterna-
tively, we can think of X as made up of labour of all different types with
^ (X) a total labour index (and L, despite the mnemonic abbreviation) as
capital. Next, X can be some, but not all types of labour with L all remain-
ing factors and ^ (X) an aggregate such as "skilled labour" and so on.
Further, it is easy to see that the analysis is not in fact restricted
to only a single output. For some purposes, where firms produce different
outputs, we can think of y(v) as dollars worth of output at fixed prices so
that total revenue is maximized. This locates points on the production possi-
bility frontier. Where firms produce more than one output, we can interpret
some elements of L as being outputs alternative to those involved in y.
A second class of interpretations involve output aggregation. Here,
^
V
f {•,•) must be interpreted as a factor-requirements: function, rather than
as a production function, with y(v) the amount of the factor demanded given
the amount of the other factors, L (v) , and the outputs to be produced, X (v)
.
Outputs and other factors are now assigned to firms to minimize total use of
y. Aggregation over X now becomes output aggregation. If some outputs are
counted in L rather than in X, such aggregation is over certain categories
of output and so forth.
To fix ideas, I shall discuss the proofs and give the theorems in terms
of aggregation over a set of factors, with (2.1) a production function,
remarking on the other interpretations from time to time. In addition, to
simplify matters, I shall take r=2 and s=l so that (2.1) becomes
(2.4) y(v) = f^(X^(v),X2(v), L(v))
and aggregation is over the two elements of X. Greater generality in this
regard only makes the proofs notationally more complex without changing them
in any substantive way. I discuss such generalization below.
I assume each of the f (•,•,*) twice continuously differentiable;
subscripts denote differentiation in the obvious way.
V
The f (*,*,•) are assiamed non-decreasing in their arguments and every factor
is assumed productive in at least one use. For most of the paper I also
assume constant returns, commenting on generalizations after the main results.
V
The Hessians of the f (•,*,*) are assumed negative semi-definite with rank
(r+s-1) which is 2 in the case of 3 factors.
Now, it is possible for (2.3) to hold and aggregation over X to be
possible without its being the case that aggregation is possible over X
g
within each firm. This is because changes in L^ even if they altered the
marginal rate of substitution between X (v) and X (v) within each firm with
X (v) and X (v) fixed fmight just happen to leave that marginal rate of s\ibsti-
tuion unaffected in the system as a whole through their effects on the re-
assignment of the X. (v) . An example is given below. However, it is
uninteresting to have an aggregate which can be formed over the entire set
of firms unless it can be formed over every sxibset, since the disappearance
of one or more firms would destroy the possibility of aggregation. Hence,
throughout this paper I use the following strong definition of aggregation:
Definition 2.1 : An aggregate over X will be said to exist if and only if
an expression in the form (2.3) exists both for the entire set of firms and
for every proper sxobset.
In other words, aggregation must be possible over every subset of fiimis.
It follows that we must assume the equivalent of (2.3) to get anywhere at
all, and I now do so.
Assumption 2.1 : Each firm's production function can be written in the form:
(2.5) f''(X(v), L(v)) = f'^(<})''(X(v)), L(v))
V
where (}> (•) is scalar valued.
V V
Remark 2.1: Since we have assumed constant returns, both F (•,•) and (() (•)
can be taken to be homogeneous of degree one in their respective arguments.
Of course the restriction in Assumption 2.1 is already very strong.
3. Aggregation With Two Firms
The heart of the analysis will be performed for two firms (n=2) . As
will be apparent later the results for n firms follow readily.
Now, there are certain cases which permit aggregation but are basically
uninteresting. The first of these, additive separability of each F^(',')
Vm ij; (•) and L(v), has already been ruled out for constant returns by our
assumption as to the rank of the Hessian of f (•,•). Another case remains
,
however. It may be that efficient factor allocation sometimes requires that
all of some factor be allocated to one firm with none allocated to the other.
In any region in which this is true for both X and X , with all of
both X and X allocated to the same firm, it is plain that aggregation is
trivial. Such an extreme case can safely be ignored, however, and I shall
assume it does not occur. The less extreme cases where not all factors are
allocated to both firms remain of interest, however.
One related remark before proceeding. As indicated in the introduction,
aggregation will turn out to be possible under either one of two conditions,
V
the first in which the F ( • , • ) can be taken to be the same and the second in
V
which the (j) (•) can be taken to be the same. It is possible for one of
these conditions to hold for some values of the variables and the other to
hold for different values. I shall be precise about this in the proofs,
but it is inconvenient to have to remember it in the discussion, so I
V V
generally speak of the F (•,*) the same or the (f> (•) the same as though a
given condition held everywhere.
I now proceed to the results. The basic theorem on aggregation to be used is
well-known theorem of Leontief (1947a, 1947b) which states that aggregation
is possible if and only if the marginal rates of substitution among variables
in the aggregate are independent of variables left out of it. The "regions"
mentioned in the analysis are in the space of total X , X and L. "Aggrega-
tion" always means aggregation over X.
Lemma 3.1: In an open region in which all of X and all of L are assigned ^
to firm 1 and all of X assigned to firm 2, aggregation is not possible.
Proof : In this case, changing the amount of L affects the marginal product
of X but not that of 5^ .
Lemma 3.2: In an open region in which all of either X or X is allocated to
V
a single firm, aggregation is possible if and only if the F (•,•) can be
taken to be the same, v=l, 2.
Proof: If both the F (",') can be taken to be the same, then L will certainly
V
be allocated to both firms so as to make the ratio L{v)/(j) (X(v)) the same
in both. Further, by Lemma 3.1, if L is not allocated to both firms,
aggregation is impossible. Hence we may as well proceed by ass\iming that
it is so allocated.
Now suppose that all of X is allocated to firm 1 everywhere in the
region in question. Then, as L changes, the fact that X is "really" mobile
plays no role and we might as well consider it as fixed capital. If X is
also fixed (totally allocated to firm 2) , then the desired result follows from
the theorem for fixed capital aggregation (Theorem 3.2 of Fisher (1965),
V
p. 268) which states that the only differences between the F (•,•) must be
capital-augmenting. We can take the values of the capital-augmenting para-
V
meter into the definition of the (J) (•). If X is allocated to both firms,
the same result follows from the similar theorem on aggregation over
fixed and movable capital goods (Theorem 4.1 of Fisher (1968b)
, p. 421)
.
The opposite case, in which the X. are allocated to both firms but L
1
is not is handled by:
Lemma 3.3 : In any open region in which the X. are assigned to both firms
but L is assigned to only one firm, aggregation is possible if and only if
the (() {•) can be taken to be the same
.
Proof: In such a region, L might just as well be immobile. Aggregation over
X is now aggregation over mobile factors in the presence of immobile ones.
Q
The desired result now follows from Theorem 5.1 of Fisher (1968a), p. 397.
All of this cannot be very surprising. It amounts to observing that
in open regions in which some factor is allocated to only one firm, then that
factor might as well be treated as immobile. Aggregation conditions then
reduce to those already known for the fixed capital case. Thus the cases
so far considered do not really exploit the mobility of all factors. We now
begin to study the case in which that mobility can be exploited — the case
in which X , X and L are assigned to both firms.
Lemma 3.4; Consider any open region in which all three factors are assigned
V
to both firms. If the F (-,•) cannot be taken to be the same, then addition
of L to the system as a whole requires some reallocation of X and X .
Proof : Suppose not. Then we can treat X (v) and X (v) as fixed (v=l, 2)
when considering the effects of changing L. Since marginal products of all
three factors must be the same in both uses both before and after the change,
it must be the case that:
(3.1) pi 8L(1) =, p2 9L(2)
LL dL LL 3L
and
(3.2) ^1 .1 IMII = p2 2 nA2l
(})L ^1 8L (j)L 1 9L
denoting differentiation by subscripts in the obvious way. This implies:
pl (1)1 f2 (j)2
(3.3) pi p2
LL LL
V
Since the F (.,.) are homogeneous of degree one, their first partials are
homogeneous of degree zero, and Euler's theorem applied to the marginal
products of L shows that (3.3) is equivalent to:
L(l)<|)^ L(2)<|)J
(3.4) ^
11 2 2 1 2Since F .ii -. = F, 4,, and F^ = F^ , this implies9+01 L L
10
Id) 12 4 2
F • -*— + F = F + F
(3.5) <() L(l) L ^ L(2) L
which, by another application of Euler's theorem gives
F F
(3.6) L(l) L(2)
so that it must be the case that L has its average product equalized over
firms whenever all marginal products are equalized. We can express this by
saying that there exists a function Q(-,-,-), independent of v such that,
for v=l, 2,
^ = Q(fV, fV, f^).
(3.7) L(v) ^ (j)*l' (t)*2' L
V
However, F is in in one-to-one correspondence with the "quasi-factor
V
ratio", <)) /L(v) and this determines average product. Thus the first two
argiaments of Q (.,.,.) are superfluous and there exists a function g(.),
independent of v such that:
SO that L has its average product equalized whenever its marginal product is
(in the open region in question) . This, however, is known to be equivalent
V V 10
to the F (.,.) differing by at most a ^ -augmenting technical change.
Since such a change can be absorbed into the definition of the <j) (
. ) , it
V
follows that the F (.,.) can be taken to be the same, which is a contradic-
tion, and the Lemma is proved.
Lemma 3.5 : In any open region in which all three factors are assigned to
each firm, aggregation is possible only if either (a) the F (.,.) can be
Vtaken to be the same or (b) the ((> ( . ) can be taken to be the same
.
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Proof: Consider changing L with X and X (the system totals) constant.
If the F^{.,.) cannot be taken to be the same, this will require reallocation
V
of at least one of the X. . If the (() (.) cannot be taken to be the same,
there must be some point at which the equality of the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between X and X in both firms requires that the ratios X (1)/
X (1) and X (2)/X (2) not be identical. Then reallocation of at least one of
the X. must alter at least one of these ratios. Such alteration will change
the marginal rate of substitution between X and X for the system as a whole.
(as well as within each firm) . Thus that marginal rate of substitution is
not invariant to changes in total L,and, by Leontief's theorem, no aggregate
exists, completing the proof.
The fact that the conditions of Lemma 3.5 are sufficient as well as
necessary is developed as part of the principal result of this section for
which we are now ready.
Theorem 3.1 : An aggregate over two firms exists if and only if, for any open
and j^i
region in the space of the X (v) , X (v) ,/ L (v) , at least one of (a) and
(b) below holds
:
V
(a) The F (., .) can be taken to be the same.
V
(b) The (}) (.) can be taken to be the same.
Proof : Necessity . This follows directly from Lemmas 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5.
Sufficiency . Much of the proof of sufficiency can be derived from
these Lemmas as well, but a more self-contained proof is more instructive,
needed for the case of all three factors assigned to both firms, and desir-
able for later purposes
.
First suppose that the F (•,•) can be taken to be the same. Then
optimal allocation of L requires that the quasi-factor ratio, (j) /L(v) be
the same for both firms. Define
12
(3.9) J = <(>''"(X(1)) + cf)^(X(2)) .
Then whenever L is optimally allocated
(3.10) (})Vl(1) = (J)Vl(2) = J/L .
let X= L(1)/L = <}) /J. Total output, when optimized, will be given by (omitting
V
the superscripts on the F (.,.) since they are both the same):
(3.11) y* = F((()"^, L(l)) + F((i)^, L(2))
= F(AJ, XL)+ F((1-X)J, (l-A)L)
= F(J,L)
by constant returns. It now follows that X and X must be allocated to the
two firms to maximize J as defined in (3.9), whence the value of J depends
only on X and X and not on L and F(J,L) is seen from (3.11) to be the
required aggregate production function.
V 13
Now suppose instead that the ((» ( • ) can be taken to be the same
.
Optimal allocation of X and X then requires that they be assigned in the
same ratio to each firm. In that case, however, the ratios X (v)/X (v)
must be the same as the over-all ratio X /X for v=l, 2. Since the marginal
rate of substitution between X and X is the same within each firm and
depends only on the ratio X (v)/X (v), that marginal rate of substitution in
the system as a whole depends only on X /X and not on L. The fact that X
and X can be aggregated now follows from Leontief 's theorem and the proof
is complete
.
V V
Note that if either the F (.,.) or the <^ (.) can be taken to be the same,
certain of the cases treated in Lemmas 3.1-3.3 cannot arise.
13
4. More Than Two Firms
Suppose now that there are many firms (n >_ 2) .
Corollary 4.1 : An aggregate over n firms exists if and only if, for any open
region in the space of X (v) , X (v) and L (v) at least one of (a) and (b)
below holds:
V
(a) All the F (.,.) can be taken to be the same.
(b) All the (|> (•) can be taken to be the same.
Proof : Sufficiency . The proofs given for sufficiency in Theorem 3.1 do not
require n=2.
Necessity . By the strong definition of aggregation (Definition 2.1,
above) , aggregation requires the existence of an aggregate over every pair
of firms. Theorem 3.1, therefore, shows that every pair of firms must have
V V
either the same F (
.
, . ) or the same ^ ( . ) if an aggregate exists . Now
V
suppose that an aggregate exists but that not all firms have F ( . , . ) which
V
can be taken to be the same. Let A be the set of all firms whose F (.,.)
can be taken to be the same as F (.,.). Let B be the set of all remaining
firms. Then neither A nor B are empty. However, the existence of an aggregate
V
requires that every firm in A and every fiinn in B have <^ {•) which can be
V
taken to be the same. Evidently, then all the <)) (•) can be taken to be the
same.
Note that appeal to the strong . definition of aggregation is required
here. Otherwise we could have the following situation. Suppose n=3 and12 3
F {.,.) and F (.,•) can be taken to be the same but F (.,.) is essentially
different. Using the construction in the sufficiency proof of Theorem 3.1
which led to (3.11), aggregate over firms one and two to form the aggregate
production function F (J,L) where L = L(l) + L{2) and
'•^^^
J = Max {(()-'-(X(l))+ (i>^(X(2))}
14
-v 3
subject to X(l) + X(2) fixed. If it now turns out that J(-) and (f. (•) can
be taken to be the same, then the third firm can be combined with the
aggregate of the first two.
1 2
The trouble with this is that unless (f) ( • ) and (j) ( • ^ can be taken to be
the same, it will not in general be true that they can be taken to be the
'V 3
same as J ( * ) or <)) ( • ) • So if the first firm were not present no aggregate
would exist.
Thus, were we to drop the strong definition of aggregation (but retain
AssiMnption 2.1 as to aggregation within each firm) , we would permit a some-
what wider class of cases along the lines just described. This widening
seems of no practical importance, however.
5. Generalizations
I now briefly consider two generalizations, the first, to more than
three factors and the second, to non-constant returns technologies.
The case in which there are more than three factors, with one exception,
presents no substantive changes. For example, the proof of Lemma 3.4 would
14
involve matrices in (3.3) but be otherwise unchanged.
The single exception involves the generalization of the cases treated
in Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 above. Suppose that L has more than one element and
that one but not all factors in L are assigned to one firm. Suppose further
that at least one X. is not assigned to both finns. Aggregation of X then
becomes isomorphic to the problem of capital aggregation when not all capital
types are to be included in the aggregate. Closed-form results are not known
for this case, although necessary and sufficient conditions are. These
conditions are extremely restrictive. The flavor of Theorem 4.1 is preserved
even with this exception by observing that at best the assumption that all
factors are mobile permits aggregation under various conditions which would
15
hold without such an assumption but does not do more than to permit the
union of such conditions.
Further, for the exception just noted to apply, it must be the case
that full mobility fails to come into play. I shall ignore this minor
complication in the remainder of the discussion.
The case of non-constant return technologies has the property that, in
V V
general, no aggregate will exist whether or not the F (•,•) or the <\) (•)
16
can be taken to be the same. It is easy to see, however, that the necessity
V
as well as the sufficiency results obtained above apply if the F (*,•) can
V Vbe taken to be constant returns in
<t) and L(v) and the (j) {•) are merely
V vhomothetic. They do not require that both the F (,•) and the <j) (•) can be
17
taken to be constant returns at the same time . A complete closed-foinn
characterization of the non-constant-returns cases permitting aggregation
is not easy to come by.
6. Interpretations
As indicated in the introduction, these results can be interpreted in
various ways in terms of factor or output aggregation. I shall give some
remarks along these lines for the simplest cases.
In terms of factor aggregation, the existence of aggregates at the firm
level (Assimiption 2.1) can be thought of as stating that each firm can be
regarded as if it had a two-stage production process (although such a descrip-
tion is only a parable and not necessarily a literal one) . In the first
stage, the factors to be aggregated (the X.(v)) are combined together to pro-
V
duce an intermediate output (the (|) (X(v))). That intermediate output is then
combined with the remaining factors (the L(v)) to produce final output.
Aggregation of X in the system as a whole can be done if and only if firms
16
are either all alike as regards the first stage of production or all alike
as regards the second stage. If they are all alike as regards the first
stage (the <|) (•) all the same), then the fact that L is mobile plays no role;
this is the condition for aggregation of mobile factors when the remainder
18 V
are fixed. If they are all alike as regards the second stage (the F (•,•)
all the same), then the fact that the X. are mobile plays no role; this is
19
the condition for aggregation of fixed factors when the remainder are mobile.
20
This is not to say that mobility does not help. Apart from the fact
that it permits instant aggregation over firms of any single factor, it aids
in other ways. If the X. were fixed, taking the ()> (•) as the same would
V
not permit aggregation; if L were fixed, taking the F (•,•) as the same
would not help.
A different insight into the results can be obtained by considering
the case of output aggregation. Here, Assximption 2.1 is the assumption that
outputs can be aggregated within each firm with the firm thought of as
V
producing a composite good (the (f> (•)) which is then split up into individual
V
outputs. The condition that the (j) (•) all be the same is the condition that
each firm, faced with the same relative output prices, produce the same mar-
ket basket with individual outputs in the same ratio as every other firm.
(What the ratios are can depend on prices.) Firms can then differ in the
scale of their composite market basket and in the way in which it is produced,
but not in its composition.
The other condition — that the F (
•
, • ) can all be taken to be the same
can be thought of as requiring that the production functions with which the
V
composite goods (the <^ (•)) are produced differ only by Hicks-neutral differ-
21 ^.
ences. In this case, however, the make-up of the composite good is unres-
tricted.
17
Output aggregation requires, however, either that all composite
goods be the same or that the technologies for producing them be essentially
the same. One implication of this concerns the case of complete specializa-
tion. Suppose that every firm produces a single good, different from that
Vproduced by any other firm. Then the
<t) (•) cannot all be the same and aggre-
gation requires only Hicks-neutral differences in technology. With only
such differences, however, the production possibility frontier for the
entire system will consist only of flats; relative output prices will be
fixed (for all outputs actually produced) and it is hardly surprising that
output aggregation is possible.
It is interesting to note, however, that even this restrictive case
becomes admissible only because all factors are assumed mobile. With fixed
capital, output aggregation is possible only with all firms producing the
22
same composite market basket.
When we leave complete specialization in outputs we obtain a somewhat
similar, but perhaps less intuitive result. Aggregation of outputs will
be possible even if each firm does not produce the same composite bundle
as every other, but only if the composite bundles produced are produced with
the same technology. In effect, the relative prices of the composite bundles
must be fixed.
In general, then, the assiomption that all factors are mobile does aid
aggregation somewhat. First (a point not the focus of this paper) , it
permits instantly the aggregation of any single factor across firms. So
far as aggregation involving more than one factor is concerned, the conditions
are seen still to be very restrictive. Aggregation is possible only under
circumstances which, in some sense, would have allowed it anyway. The only
18
gain is that now either the condition which would have permitted aggrega-
tion of fixed factors (the F^(*,*) the same) or the condition which would
V
have permitted aggregation of movable factors or outputs (the <{> (•) the
same) will do. Aggregation can thus take place in somewhat wider circum-
stances; however, in a sense, no new cases are introduced. It thus turns
out that aggregation across firms plays quite as big a role in the diffi-
culties of aggregate production functions as does the fixity of capital.
NOTES
1. For present purposes, the important papers in the series are Fisher (1965)
,
(1968a) , and (1968b) . Fisher (1969) presents a non-technical survey.
(I am not, of course, the only one to work in this area. See Fisher (1969)
for other references.)
2. Some of the statements which follow assume away the Nataf case in which all
firms' production functions are additively separable. See Fisher (1969)
and Nataf (1948)
.
3. There are similar conditions — and one additional very strong one in the
case of capital — for the construction of partial rather than full aggre-
gates but these will not directly concern us here. See Fisher (1965)
,
(1968a), 1968b), (1969) and (1981).
4. Essentially Robinson (1953-54) and Solow (1955-56)
.
5. See Brown and Chang ( 1976 ) for an analysis which can be so interpreted.
6. This means, in effect, that they will not differ at all, since such
changes can be absorbed into the definition of the aggregate
.
7. As already observed, the assumption of fixed capital also produces stringent
conditions if only some capital types are to be aggregated.
8. In the case in which X is capital and capital is fixed this cannot happen;
where L is capital and fixed it may. See Fisher (1965) and (1968a)
.
9. That theorem is proved for the case in which each firm has a non-zero
amount of capital (here L) . However, careful reading of the proof of
Lemma 3.1 (Fisher (1968a), pp. 394-95) shows that this is
immaterial.
10. See Theorems 3.1' and 3.2 of Fisher (1965), p. 268. Note that the fact
that X is assigned to both firms is not used in the proof. This corres-
ponds to the fact that the same line of proof as that just given applies
to the case of one of the X's fixed. (See Fisher (1968b), pp. 421-23.) That
case was treated as part of Lemma 3.2, above
.
11. Note that this is not the same as the open regions used in the Lemmas
which were in the space of the factor totals Of course, it turns out
to make no difference.
12. The following proof is based on Solow's proof of the sufficiency of capital-
augmentation for the aggregation of fixed capital. (Solow (1964) , pp. 104-
105. See also Fisher (1969), pp. 559-60.)
13. The following sufficiency proof follows that given in Fisher (1968a)
,
pp. 406-407 for a different theorem.
14. And an appeal to Theorems 7.1' and 7.2 of Fisher (1965), pp. 282-83 instead
of Theorem 3.1' and 3.2, p. 268.
15. See Fisher (1965), pp. 274-77, Fisher (1968b), pp. 423-24, Fisher (1969),
pp. 561-62, 568-69, and Fisher (1981). Incidentally, the existence of
this case shows that the results given in Fisher (1968a) pp. 401-405, that
under constant returns absence of specialization is necessary for aggrega-
tion of mobile factors in the presence of fixed capital is limited to the
case in which all mobile factors are to be included in the aggregate.
(The remarks following Theorem 9.1, p. 407, overlook this possibility.)
This is not vmimportant since, along lines observed in the introduction,
output aggregation when capital is fixed and there is more than one mobile
factor can be cast into this form. Other cases also arise. The cases
permitting aggregation in such circiamstances are extremely special,
however.
16. Cf. Fisher (1965), p. 270.
17. Cf. Fisher (1965), pp. 270-72, Fisher (1968a), pp. 399-401, and Fisher (1968b)
pp. 424-26.
18. See Fisher (1968a).
19. See Fisher (1965). Cf. Fisher (1968b),
20. Cf. Fisher (1968b), pp. 423-24 and Fisher (1969), pp. 568-69.
21. Scalar multiplication of (\> in (2.5) is a Hicks-neutral shift if the f (•,•)
are interpreted as factor-requirements functions.
22. See Fisher (1968a).
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